Copenhagen & Beyond: Enforcement Mechanisms
An audience member asks the panelists what the enforcement mechanism will be if a legally binding agreement is adopted at the Copenhagen Climate Conference in December 2009. Takao Shibata, chair of the working group that drafted the Kyoto Protocol, explains that the decision was made at Kyoto to postpone the decision, however he believes the enforcement mechanism "cannot be punitive" and must be facilitative. Elliott Diriger, Vice President of International Strategies, Pew Center on Global Climate Change, concurs and suggests that "naming and shaming," or public embarrasing nations who fail to fulfill the agreement, is an effective strategy. Masayoshi Arai, Director of JETRO New York, adds that although some have suggested creating new international institutions to be in charge of these checks, he believes a more realistic approach could be to rely on the current national institutions that do this kind of work for each country.
Questions for students:
1. What options for enforcement mechanisms do the panelists outline? Which one(s) do you think would be most effective and why? Why do the panelists oppose punitive measures?
2. Can you think of other examples of international agreements where "naming and shaming" was the primary enforcement mechanism? In what sort of situations does this strategy work? What are the pros and cons?
Related Debate Videos:
Copenhagen & Beyond: Goals
Copenhagen & Beyond: Market Mechanisms
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